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Abstract
The appearance of the Internet reduces transaction costs greatly, and brings the
boom of online markets. While we are trying to regard it as the most realistic
approximation of perfect competition market, the asymmetric information and a
series of problems caused by it stop us from dreaming. As the old saying goes, there
is no free lunch. This summer witnessed the collapse of the reputation system in
Taobao, the biggest online transaction website in China. In fact, during the evolution
of mechanisms in online markets, reputation, punishment and barriers to entry have
been established in turn. What do we pay for maintaining these mechanisms? In
which circumstance will they be eﬀective?
In this paper I try to build a series of models within the principal-agent frame-
work and repeated games to explain why and what we should pay for asymmetric
information while enjoying shopping online. Speciﬁcally, these mechanisms are con-
sidered step by step and their boundary validation conditions are discussed. Finally,
as the conclusion indicates, the more range that a mechanism is eﬀective, the more
opportunity cost should be paid as a rent for information.
1 Introduction
Nowadays in China, more and more consumers are fond of shopping online, which has
obviously been the most popular and active form of electronic commerce. At the same
time, this frictionless and competitive environment is the most realistic approximation of
perfect competition market, the economist’s ideal model. In fact, I couldn’t ﬁnd a better
ﬁeld to examine the eﬀectiveness of related theories.
Its contribution to China’s economy cannot be overlooked. In spite of the inﬂuence from
ﬁnancial crisis and earthquake, the total volume of online sales was nearly 130 billion RMB
(about $19 billion) in 2008, which occupied 1.2% of social retails, and it has successfully
been the most vibrant role in domestic economy at the growth speed of 128.5%, compared
to the previous year. Furthermore, the low barriers to entry in online markets enable
numerous individuals to own a shop online, thereby creating a large amount of new jobs.
For instance, Taobao.com, the biggest online auction website in China, has successfully
created about 690,000 jobs, which equals duodecimal nationwide number. Up to present,
there are more than 100 billion registered users in Taobao, and a large proportion of them
are able to live independently, with online sales as the only source of income.
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However, unlike the perfection on the surface, the natural asymmetric information causes
several problems. A good example is the reputation crisis happened in the summer of
2009, which leaded to the temporary breakdown of the whole market. Why doesn’t the
mechanism of reputation work as well as designed? Why is Taobao encouraging its old
sellers to transfer to the new Shopping Mall, which requires higher entry cost?
What is interesting is that the online website for C2C transactions in China has a unique
pattern of pricing. Diﬀerent from online auction websites in the U.S. or U.K., almost
every transactions in Taobao is completed in the form called “Buy now price” (the seller
oﬀers the price directly and the buyer chooses the goods labeled with pre-determined
price), which is quite distinct from those in EBay. Therefore, instead of paying attention
to the mechanism design of auction or psychological analysis of both sides’ behaviors, we
need to focus more on the eﬀectiveness of the mechanisms designed to solve the troubles
originated from moral hazard.
If we search for the development history of Taobao, it can be found easily that the mech-
anism of reputation, punishment and barrier to entry are established in turn. Thus, the
ﬁrst aim of this paper is to ﬁnd out why the mechanism evolution in online markets hap-
pens. I will use the boundary conditions of validation, which are obtained from a series
of economic models, to explain how the truth violates these conditions.
In addition, I also care about the situation of consumer’s and social surplus under every
mechanism. The change, especially the decrease, in their surplus can be regarded as the
opportunity costs of establishing these mechanisms.
A lot of previous papers have discussed the asymmetric information problem in online
markets, as well as more empirical researches. [Limited to the length of this writing
sample, this information is omitted. You may see the reference list instead.]
The following part of this paper is arranged as below: in the second section the initial
market is considered and the reason why it is not eﬀective is discussed; in third section,
the mechanisms of reputation, punishment and barrier to entry are taken into account
step by step, and the boundary conditions are provided; in the fourth section the historical
evidence from traditional markets is displayed in order to make a comparison; in the ﬁfth
section the empirical results from Taobao are used to test the theoretical models; the
conclusion is at last.
2 The Initial Market
The initial market is the one without any interference from outside mechanisms (i.e. there
is no reputation, punishment mechanism or barriers to entry). Then consider this process
of online transactions:
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
the buyer oﬀers
a contact with
price p
the seller
accepts or
refuses it
the seller
provides high or
low quality
goods
the buyer
receives the
goods [end]
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Model Design Within the principal-agent framework from Laﬀont & Martimort (2002),
these assumptions are made:
1. There are only two kinds of goods in the market: High-quality goods q and Low-
quality goods q. The buyer’s utility function is u(q), where u0 > 0 and u00 < 0.
2. The seller’s cost of providing High-quality goods is c and Low-quality goods is c,
where c > c. Here we can simply ignore the logistic costs, or it can be calculated in
to the total cost directly since there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between these two
kinds of goods.
3. The supply is inelastic while the demand is elastic, so the price is determined by
the buyer’s willingness to pay.
Therefore, for every individual seller in the market, given the price p, their participation
constraints must thus be satisﬁed:
p  c  c (1)
Meanwhile, their incentive compatibility constraint (which enables the seller to provide
high-quality goods) must satisfy:
p  c  p  c (2)
However, according to our assumptions, (2) will be deﬁnitely violated. This result indi-
cates that according to the asymmetric information existing in the market, the seller is
more willing to provide Low-quality goods, which is called “moral hazard”, the same as
the traditional “lemon market” analyzed by Akerlof (1970).
3 The Evolution of Mechanisms
3.1 The Reputation Mechanism
In the early phase of development, because of the absence of third-part agency and the lack
of feasible technique, the only mechanism available in online markets was the reputation.
It indicates that, at that time, the only signal could be observed by the buyers before the
transaction was the number of positive feedback (reputation rankings).
Now the process (mechanism before transaction) is:
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 5
the seller choose
the eﬀort level,
and obtained a
signal
the buyer oﬀers
a contract with
price p or p
the seller
accepts or
refuses it
the seller
provides high or
low quality
goods
the buyer
receives the
goods [end]
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Model Design Following the Informativeness of Signals model (Laﬀont & Martimort,
2002), these additional assumptions are made:
1. For every individual seller, their eﬀorts are normalized respectively as a zero level
(e = 0) and a positive level of one (e = 1). It also implies that the seller must pay
a cost 	(e) for exerting eﬀort, and 	(0) = 0, 	(1) = 	.
2. The seller’s utility function is B(p; e) = p   	(e), where p 2 fp; pg (i.e. the rep-
resentative buyer’s willingness to pay for High-Reputation seller is p, and p for
Low-Reputation seller).
3. Only two signals can be observed, 1 for High-Reputation seller, and 0 for Low-
Reputation seller (i.e. the signals are belonging to a binary set  = f0; 1g).
Furthermore, assume that the signal sent by the seller is only directly depended on
their eﬀort level e 2 f0; 1g.
4. To avoid the assumption of homogeneous buyers, we can instead use the average
level – the probability of sending a particular type of signal based on the eﬀort:
e = 0 e = 1
1 v0 v1
0 1  v0 1  v1
Here it can be assumed that v1  v0, which implies that in order to send a High-
Reputation signal, the seller must choose a higher eﬀort level. Especially, when
v1 = 1 and v0 = 0, the seller must make higher eﬀort to obtain the High-Reputation
signal, and this signal is publicly recognized by every member in the market.
5. When the seller choose e = 1, the probability of them to provide High-quality goods
P equals Pfeq = qje = 1g = 1, and 1  1 for Low-quality goods; the probability of
a seller with e = 0 to provide High-quality goods Pfeq = qje = 1g = 0 and 1   0
for Low-quality goods.
At this time, the buyer, as the principal, can divide the sellers into 4 groups:
state description probability when e = 0 probability when e = 1
y1 = fq; 1g High-Reputation sellerprovides High-quality goods 10 = 0v0 11 = 1v1
y2 = fq; 0g Low-Reputation sellerprovides High-quality goods 20 = 0(1  v0) 21 = 1(1  v1)
y3 = fq; 1g High-Reputation sellerprovides Low-quality goods 30 = (1  0)v0 31 = (1  1)v1
y4 = fq; 0g Low-Reputation sellerprovides Low-quality goods 40 = (1  0)(1  v0) 41 = (1  1)(1  v1)
Therefore, the participation constraint is:
4X
i=1
i1B(pi; ei)  0 (3)
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Meanwhile, their incentive compatibility constraint must satisfy:
4X
i=1
i1B(pi; ei) 
4X
i=1
i0B(pi; ei) (4)
Now writes the buyer’s program as:
max
fp;pg
u =
4X
i=1
(i1 + i0)(u(qi)  pi) (5)
s:t: (3)  (4) (6)
Solve this optimal program and discuss its ﬁrst-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions (see the
appendix), we can obtain these conclusions:
 (Only) When v1 = v0 (i.e.  is not informative on the seller’s eﬀort), the seller is
not willing to make any eﬀort to send a positive signal.
 When v1 > v0, there must be p = 0, which indicates that the buyer will pay nothing
for a Low-Reputation seller. Hence, any seller in the market will make an eﬀort
to pursue the High-Reputation signal; otherwise they will be driven out from the
market.
 Under this mechanism, there is no incentive for the sellers to improve there qual-
ity of service or probability of providing High-quality goods, since 1 and 0 are
not existing in the ﬁrst-order conditions. However, these probabilities are positive
correlated with the buyer’s utility.
Dynamic Analysis of Reputation Mechanism
Although the analysis above indicates the equilibrium result, there is still a condition left
to make the mechanism eﬀective. That is the seller’s participation constraint (3). To have
a better understanding of why they will actually participate in the competitive market, a
repeated game model will be more persuasive.
Generally, the rule of the game can be interpreted as: if a seller provides High-quality
goods at time t 1 with the eﬀort e = 1, in the next period t , the probabilities of sending
a signal increase, where v1;t  v1;t 1 and v0;t 1  v0;t; On the contrary, if he provides Low-
quality goods, in the next period, v1;t  v1;t 1 and v0;t 1  v0;t. Let 4v1;t = v1;t   v1;t 1
and 4v0;t = v0;t   v0;t 1. The discount factor is .
Particularly, when the buyer follows the trigger strategy1:
 The seller is only able to send 0 during the ﬁrst N   1 periods of the game. i.e.
v0;t = v1;t = 0 (1  t  N   1) and 4v1;t = 4v0;t = 0 (2  t  N   1).
1It not only makes the game simple but is also realistic, according to the common reactions of the
consumers in the real world.
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 If a seller provides High-quality goods during all N   1 periods (i.e. e = 1), then
he can obtain 1 in the Nth period. i.e. v1;N = v0;N = 1 and 4v1;N = 4v0;N = 1.
However, if he provides Low-quality goods once, he will be driven out from the
market and the game is over.
 If the seller High-quality goods in the Nth period, he can continue to send 1 in the
N + 1 period. Otherwise, he will be driven out.
To make the model simpler, consider that if there are only one periods before N (i.e.
N = 2). Now there are several feasible strategies for the sellers: (1) Provide High-quality
goods in the ﬁrst N   1 periods to obtain the High-Reputation signal in the Nth period.
(2) Always provide Low-quality goods.
Now the payoﬀ matrix is
t = 1 t = 2; 3; : : :
High-quality Low-quality High-quality Low-quality
High Price p - - (u(q)  p; p  c) (u(q)  p; p  c)
Low Price p (u(q)  p; p  c) (u(q)  p; p  c) - -
Therefore, if the game continues, the sellers will choose strategy (1), which is their strictly
dominated strategy, to reach the Nash equilibrium in each stage and ﬁnally arrive at the
sub-game-perfect outcome, if
 c
1     c+ (p  c)

1   (7)
or
  c  c
p
(8)
And the equilibrium result is: the buyers pay high price and the sellers provide High-
quality goods, which is the goal of an eﬀective mechanism.
Since now we can deﬁne the seller’s cost 	 as 	 =
PN 1
t=1 (c  c)(1 + r)t, where r = 1  .
Then the seller’s participation constraint (3) can be rewritten as
v1p 
N 1X
t=1
(c  c)(1 + r)t (9)
With these analysis above we can ﬁnally obtain (see appendix for proofs):
Proposition 1. The reputation mechanism will function well if the market satisﬁes the
seller’s participation constraint (9) and the assumption above that v1 > v0.
Then the outcome is that the buyers pay high price and the sellers provide High-quality
goods.
Proposition 2. If the reputation mechanism functions well, then the equilibrium price
for High-quality goods is
p1 = [
PN 1
t=1 (c  c)(1 + r)t]=v1
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Why is the reputation not reliable? The truth is not as ideal as the imagination
from these models above. In contrast, the reputation crisis happened in Taobao in the
summer of 2009, as some news reported2. But the reason is so simple that may be beyond
economist’s expectation. The only cause is that the sellers can get a high level reputation
easily by creating fraudulent transaction records with the help of their friends or some
professional companies with a every low cost. Therefore, the real situation violates the
assumption that “the signal sent by the seller only directly depends on their eﬀort level”
(i.e. now v1  v0).
3.2 The Punishment Mechanism
Having seen the poor situation in the real market, we have to pay attention to another
mechanism: punishment, which is deﬁned as if the buyers verify that they have received
Low-quality goods, they can apply for “treble-price compensation” (i.e. the sellers will
pay three times as a punishment).
Now the process (mechanism after transaction) is:
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 5
the buyer oﬀers
a contract with
price p
the seller
accepts or
refuses it
the seller
provides high or
low quality
goods
the buyer makes
an eﬀort to
identify the
quality of the
goods
the seller pay
treble-price as a
punishment
Model Design Consider this situation: the buyer must pay for identifying whether the
quality is high or low. Speciﬁcally, assume:
1. The buyers cannot observe any signal before transactions (or they do not believe
the reputation), and they oﬀer a price p to buy the goods.
2. The buyers believe that a seller would provide High-quality goods with the proba-
bility , and Low-quality with 1  .
3. The buyers can successfully verify that the goods are Low-quality ones with the
probability . But they must pay d() for this action, and d0() > 0, d00() > 0.
4. When the goods is veriﬁed as a Low-quality one, the seller must pay treble price 3p
to the buyers.
Therefore, the participation constraint is:
p  c  0 (10)
Meanwhile, their incentive compatibility constraint must satisfy:
p  c  (p  c  3p) + (1  )(p  c) (11)
2see: http://news.xinhuanet.com/tech/2009-08/04/content_11824446.htm
7
Now the buyer’s program writes now as:
max
p;
u = u(q) + (1  )(u(q) +   3p+ (1  )  0)  p  d() (12)
s:t: (10)  (11)
To solve (12), we can obtain these results (see appendix for proofs):
Proposition 3. The boundary validation condition for the punishment mechanism is that
  c c
3c
> 0.
Meanwhile, since @d()
@
=  3p < 0, for a given level of , the buyers pay less when the
probability  increases.
Proposition 4. If the punishment mechanism is eﬀective, the equilibrium price for High-
quality goods is p2 = c, which is the same as symmetric information.
However, although here the equilibrium price p2 is obviously lower than p1, it doesn’t
necessarily mean that the buyer’s welfare is better, since they must pay for identifying
the quality.
What is the limitation of the punishment? From the analysis above, it can be easily
seen that the eﬀectiveness of punishment mechanism heavily depends on the probability
of successful identiﬁcation  and the cost for identifying. Thus, for some kinds of goods,
such as a book or a VIP card, they can be easily identiﬁed. In contrast, for those goods
like cosmetic or digital equipments, the buyers must pay a very high cost to identify.
In conclusion, the punishment mechanism is limited to the categories of goods, which is
not applicable to the entire market.
3.3 The Barriers to Entry Mechanism
Although we hope that the reputation and punishment mechanisms will have a signiﬁ-
cantly positive inﬂuence on the seller’s behaviors, the fact shatters our dream. Due to
the unreliable reputation records and the high costs of identifying, these mechanisms are
not strong enough to protect the buyer’s rights perfectly. As a result, other mechanisms
are designed as substitutions, such as barriers to entry and trader’s coalition. Here we
only consider the former one, since the latter one has already been discussed by numerous
researchers like Greif (1993) in a historical approach.
The “Taobao Mall” is a new website for B2C transactions, which was built in 2008. As its
objection described, B2C transactions are diﬀerent from traditional C2C ones in a large
extent. The most signiﬁcant characteristic is that it has a much stricter requirement of the
sellers. Every shop owners in Taobao Mall must be certiﬁcated by national institutions,
and at least they should provide a business license, which is issued by law. Moreover, the
transactions are supervised by the website with punishment rules. All these requirements
can be simply regarded as barriers to entry, and the seller’s cost includes the eﬀort to
get a license and the obligation of punishment rules. Hence, the analysis of barriers to
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entry includes both the mechanism of reputation and punishment, but not the same as
analyzed in the former section.
Now the process (mixed mechanism) is:
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 5 t = 6
the seller
decides whether
to enter the
mall with an
eﬀort
the buyer oﬀers
a contract with
price p or p
the seller
accepts or
refuses it
the seller
provides high or
low quality
goods
the buyer makes
an eﬀort to
identify the
quality of the
goods
the seller pay
treble-price as a
punishment
Model Design Assume that the seller must make an eﬀort 	 to enter the mall to send
a High-Reputation signal, and others who fail to entering can only send a Low-Reputation
signal (i.e. v1 = 1 and v0 = 0). Here I also assume that there is only one punishment3 –
treble price– to make the model concise.
Now the signals observed are simpliﬁed to:
state description probability
y1 = fq; 1g seller in the mall providesHigh-quality goods 1
y2 = fq; 0g seller out of the mallprovides High-quality goods 0
y3 = fq; 1g seller in the mall providesLow-quality goods 1  1
y4 = fq; 0g seller out of the mallprovides Low-quality goods 1  0
Therefore, the participation constraint on entering the mall is:
p  c 	  0 (13)
Meanwhile, their incentive compatibility constraint must satisfy:
p  c 	  ( c  2p) + (1  )(p  c) 	 (14)
The participation constraint of other sellers to remain in the market is:
p  c  0 (15)
And also the incentive compatibility constraint of them is:
p  c  p  c (16)
Now the buyer’s program writes now as:
max
p;p;
u = 1(u(q) p)+0(u(q) p)+(1 1)(u(q) (1 )p+2p)+(1 0)(u(q) p) d()
(17)
3In fact, considering the whole brand inﬂuence, the real punishment will be much heavier.
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s:t: (13)  (16)
Similarly, the participation constraint (13) is not easy to be satisﬁed without dynamic
analysis.
Dynamic Analysis Here we continue to use the repeated game model. However, there
are slight diﬀerences in the strategies:
 Period 1: The sellers decide whether to enter the mall with an eﬀort 	 or remain
outside of the mall.
 Period 2 and then on: The buyers pay a high price p for in-mall sellers, and a low
one p for others.
Then the payoﬀ matrix after stage 2 is:
t = 2; 3; : : :
High-quality Low-quality
High Price p (u(q)  p; p  c) (u(q)  p; p  c)
Low Price p (u(q)  p; p  c) (u(q)  p; p  c)
Compare two strategies available for the seller4:
1. To enter the mall and provide High-quality goods, their expectation of payoﬀ is
B1 = (p  c)( + 2 +   + n) 	.
2. To stay outside of the mall, their expectation is B2 = (p  c)( + 2 +   + n)
Similarly, these propositions can be obtained (see appendix for proofs):
Proposition 5. The boundary validation conditions for the barriers to entry mechanism
are   c c
3(c+	)
and  > 	
(p p) (c c) 	 .
Then the Nash equilibrium outcome is: the sellers in the mall provide High-quality goods,
and other sellers are driven out of the market. Now it can be seen clearly that the buyers
pay less for identifying under this mixed mechanism. If the equilibrium is reached, the
price is also determined.
Proposition 6. Given a discount factor , the equilibrium price p3 = 	

1  + c.
Therefore, p3 is larger than p2, and is likely to be higher than p1, which implies that the
buyer’s welfare are worse compared with these two situations above. So this mechanism is
the last choice. If we consider the possibility of monopoly, the price may be even higher.
4Because of the trigger strategy, they will not choose to provide Low-quality goods after entering the
market.
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4 Comparison to Traditional Markets: A Historical Ap-
proach
The nature of online markets is similar to the traditional ones except the way and speed
of transiting information, and the reason why I am interested in online markets is that
it is an approximation of perfect competition markets existing in the real world. In this
case, a comparison to the evolution history of traditional market may be revealing. As
Greif (1993) indicates, the change in contract forms will have a remarkable inﬂuence on
economic development.
[To be ﬁnished...]
5 Empirical Tests
5.1 The estimations of boundary conditions
5.2 The eﬀectiveness of existing mechanisms
[To be ﬁnished...]
6 Conclusion
According to my theoretical models, all of these three mechanisms will be eﬀective in
particular environments. A stimulative result of valid areas is shown below:
ρ
δ0
Reputation
Punishment
Barriers to Entry
The Valid Areas of Different Mechanisms
However, with the interruption of some “noise” or baleful actions, the mechanism of bar-
riers to entry is the only left choice for market designers to use, because it reduces the
level of competitiveness as well as consumer’s welfare.
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In addition, with the compassion to traditional markets.....the empirical results also....[To
be ﬁnished...]
Furthermore, when paying attention to price-determine principles, the consumer should
either pay premiums for High-Reputation sellers or make an eﬀort to identify the quality,
or even both. The situations of consumer’s welfare (given a certain budget) are shown in
the following ﬁgure (one shadow area represents one mechanisms).
p=c
u(q)d(  )
p
n
budget
0
ρ
Reputation
Punishment
Barriers to Entry
constraint
Consumer’s Welfare Under Different Mechanisms
Symmetric Information
Therefore, the existing of these mechanisms that enables the normal order of the market
has actually caused an opportunity cost. So the signiﬁcance of mechanism design to
economic activities can be interpreted clearly.
While the development of science and technology is making our everyday lives better with
new innovative applications, it is necessary to ﬁnd out how the information will inﬂuence
microeconomic activities. Does it really reduce the level of asymmetric information? What
is their inﬂuence on contracts and the determination of price? The online market is a ideal
ground to test the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent mechanisms and ﬁnd out their opportunity
costs. Thus, the combination of theoretical models and experimental applications is the
direction of future research.
Appendix
Proofs for Proposition 1-6
In this sample only, the appendix is omitted. Brieﬂy, the demonstration relays on the
solving of the buyer’s programs using Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
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